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Abstract
This paper provides an overview of the most recent developments
on Russian cereal markets. A review of annual statistics on domes-
tic production, trade, consumption, and storage of cereals reveals
that the improvement in Russia’s net trade position cannot only be
explained by increased productivity of grain producers. Exhausted
storage capacities and lowered real trade costs after the devaluation
of the Russian rouble in 1998 seem to have contributed to these
developments. A computable general equilibrium model for Russia
based  on  1999  data  was  used  for  analyzing  various  economic
developments and policy changes. The model simulations show that
market protection in the short run, when the flexibility of labor and
capital is restricted, may benefit Russian farmers. If, however, in
the  long  run  such  structural  rigidities  can  be  abolished,  a  more
liberal trade regime would also be positive for the domestic farm
sector.
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Zusammenfassung
Diese Studie gibt einen Überblick über die neueren Entwicklungen
auf den Getreidemärkten Russlands. Eine nähere Betrachtung ver-
schiedener  Indikatoren  für  inländische  Produktion,  Handel,  Ver-
brauch und Lagerhaltung zeigt,  dass  die  Veränderung der  Netto-
handelsposition Russlands nicht nur durch gesteigerte Produktivität
der Getreideproduzenten erklärt werden kann. Ausgelastete Lager-
kapazitäten und verringerte reale Handelskosten nach der Abwer-
tung  des  Rubels  im  Jahr  1998  scheinen  eine  wesentliche  Rolle
gespielt zu haben. Die Analyse verschiedener wirtschaftlicher Ent-
wicklungen  und  Auswirkungen  von  marktpolitischen  Maßnahmen
erfolgte mit einem Allgemeinen Gleichgewichtsmodell mit 1999 als
Basisjahr. Die durchgeführten Simulationen zeigen, dass russische
Landwirte kurzfristig von Maßnahmen zur Marktprotektion profitie-
ren, wenn angenommen wird, dass Arbeit und Kapital im Betrach-
tungszeitraum im Agrarsektor gebunden sind. In einem längerfristi-
gen Betrachtungszeitraum, in dem solche Rigiditäten nicht gelten,
wäre eine liberale Handelspolitik auch für den russischen Agrarsek-
tor vorteilhafter.
Schlüsselwörter
Russland; Landwirtschaft; Getreide; Handel; Allgemeine Gleichge-
wichtsanalyse
1. Introduction
In the past few years, grain production in the Russian Fed-
eration has increased continuously due to a number of fac-
tors: the significant real depreciation of the Rouble in the
aftermath of the 1998 financial crisis opened “windows of
opportunities” for domestic agriculture and the food indus-
tries because it improved the relative prices between im-
ported and domestic products in  favor  of  the  latter.  This
increased  price  competitiveness  of  domestic  consumer
goods relative to imports has yielded significantly  higher
rates of return on investments in the domestic sectors. In
response, capital that used to be exported abroad before the
crisis has increasingly been invested in domestic food in-
dustries and with a time lag of one year also in domestic
agriculture.  Additionally,  selected  improvements  in  the
institutional environment, such as in leasing opportunities
of land, facilitated the emergence of new, vertically inte-
grated agro-holdings and a reduction in the number of loss-
making former collective farms. Hence, the financial crisis
initiated  economic  changes  which  together  with  positive
institutional  changes  provided  the  incentives  to  entrepre-
neurs  to  invest  into  efficiency  enhancing  technology  and
farm management systems. Furthermore, favorable climatic
conditions over the three years 1999-2002 have contributed
to a steady increase of grain production in Russia.
However, the recent increase in real incomes and the con-
comitant  increase  in  demand  for  livestock  products  have
not  translated  into  a  significantly  higher  demand  for  do-
mestic livestock or cereal products yet. Instead a notable
increase in meat imports has been observed, while domestic
livestock production has not increased as much as Russian
policy  makers  had  hoped.  Due  to  these  reasons,  Russia
accumulated a substantial surplus in domestic grain markets
and became a net exporter unexpectedly fast (some authors
expected it much earlier). In fact, early estimates of grain
exports  in  2002  revealed  exports  of  over  9  (almost  10)
million metric tons (mt). Export facilities and capacities are
seriously constrained, however, and traders have difficulties
in getting shipping quotas in the export harbors and hence
in  getting  their  commodities  abroad.  Therefore,  in  2002,
domestic cereal prices plummeted, by between 30 – 40% as
compared to 2001 (DÜRR, 2002). Compared to the previous
two years the relative profitability of cereal production has
thus fallen significantly. Generally this trend has been more
pronounced for cereals of lower quality, e.g. feed grain.
Because  of  these  drastic  changes  cereal  producers  have
increased  their  demands  for  market  interventions  by  the
Government  of  Russia  (GOR)  to  cushion  the  downward
trend  of  cereal  prices.  The  GOR  has  responded  to  these
demands  and  in  fall  2002  implemented  an  intervention
scheme for cereal markets. In April 2003 it also introduced
import quotas for meat which effectively limit meat imports
from  abroad.  Against  this  background,  this  paper  will
review  and  analyze  the  various  policy  options  that  areAgrarwirtschaft 53 (2004), Heft 4
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currently being discussed with respect to cereal markets. In
section 2 of the paper we will provide a more detailed over-
view of the most important trends in Russian cereal mar-
kets, the reasons for the change in its trade position, and
policy options that are currently proposed and discussed. In
chapter 3 peculiarities of Russia’s farm sector that are rele-
vant for policy analysis will be discussed. Chapter 4 ana-
lyzes important current cereal market policies on the basis
of an economy-wide simulation model (a Computable Gen-
eral Equilibrium (CGE) model). This model highlights not
only the sectoral effects of agricultural policies but also the
effects  of  respective  policies  on  the  government  budget,
other sectors in the economy, and trade-related indicators.
Chapter 5 summarizes the policy conclusions.
2. Structures and trends in Russia’s cereal
markets
In 2001 and 2002 grain production in the Russian Federa-
tion  increased  so  substantially  that  Russia  became  a  net
exporter of cereals for the first time since 1913. The total
output of cereals increased by 30% between the years 2000
and  2002.  This  phenomenon  is  partly  explained  by  in-
creased  productivity  of  the  agricultural  sector  itself  and
partly by favourable climatic conditions during these years.
Despite the climate effect, several analysts expect a persis-
tent change in the Russian net trade position in grain mar-
kets (e.g. LIEFERT and OSBORNE, 2002). The change in the
country’s net trade position that begun in 2001 has shown
significant effects on Russia’s cereal markets in 2002 al-
ready:  domestic  prices  fell,  which
in  turn  led  to  lower  incomes  of
those  agricultural  producers  who
had  to  sell  their  harvest  at  prices
much lower than those anticipated
at the time of seeding. Even though
domestic  feed  demand  increased
slightly and stocks were filled up,
neither  of  these  actions  could  ab-
sorb all of the increase in supply.
Consequently  grain  was  exported
and neither the high transportation
costs  nor  the  limited  export-
capacities  of  Russian  seaports
could  prevent  traders  from  sup-
plying  substantial  quantities  to
world  grain  markets.  The  result
was  a  rise  in  grain  exports  over
2000 to 2002 by about 600% (ERS
PS&D, 2002) in which the change
from  2000  to  2001  was  the  most
significant (see figure 1).
These dynamics have resulted in calls for a more active role
of the government in Russia’s cereal markets. On the one
hand, there is a demand for income support measures for
cereal  producers.  Respective  options  discussed  include
direct  policy  measures  such  as  government  purchases  of
grains and government stockpiling and indirect policies like
tariff  rate  quotas  on  meat  imports  and  subsidies  for  the
improvement  of  the  transportation  infrastructure.  On  the
other  hand,  there  are  the  ongoing  negotiations  with  the
WTO over Russia’s accession: because some of the  pro-
spective  trade  partners  have  relatively  highly  protected
agricultural markets, Russian negotiators claim bound lev-
els of import tariffs, domestic support to agriculture, and
export  subsidies  upon  accession  to  the  WTO  which  are
much  higher  than  today’s  levels  (WEHRHEIM,  2003b).
1
However,  this  contradicts  the  WTO’s  attempt  to  reduce
agricultural protection world-wide and is therefore opposed
particularly by the free-trade advocates in the WTO, such
as New Zealand and Australia.
An important stimulus for the most recent trends in Russian
cereal markets came from the significant devaluation of the
Russian Rouble in the course of the financial crisis in mid-
1998. Prior to the crisis the share of food in total Russian
imports averaged between 25 and 30% and Russia’s food
trade deficit increased to almost $US 12 billion in 1997.
Because of the financial crisis the nominal exchange rate of
the Rouble to US$ fell from about 6 Rouble/US$ in July
1998  to  28  Rouble/US$  in  August  1998  and  stabilized
around  23  Rouble/US$  in  early  1999  (RECEP,  1999).
While inflation caused a somewhat smoother development
of  the  real  exchange  rate  in  the  course  of  this  crisis  the
respective real devaluation  was  with about 40% still sig-
nificant. This real devaluation increased the prices of im-
ported commodities within a period of a few weeks while
the prices for domestic products increased at a lower rate
according to the inflation rate. Domestic products became
cheaper in relative terms while imports became more ex-
pensive. Particularly meat imports plummeted in the after-
math of the crisis. Agro-food imports in 1999 were 40%
below the pre-crisis 1997 level (OECD, 2000: 142).
                                                          
1  In  fact,  Russia  demands  the  right  to  grant  export  subsidies
to cereal produces even though such subsidies have not been
granted directly in the 1990s. The Russian negotiators argue,
however, that subsidized rail freight rates in the early 1990s
effectively  constituted  export  subsidies.  WTO  negotiations
will not be covered directly in this paper because the issue
has been discussed in other studies (KISILEV and ROMASHKIN,
2002; WEHRHEIM, 2003b).
Figure 1. Grain exports of the Russian Federation,




















CGRAIN:  Quantity of coarse grains (barley, rye, maize, oats, buckwheat and other coarse
grains)
WHEAT: Quantity of bread and feed quality wheat
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Hence, and as predicted by various authors (e.g. SEROVA et
al.,  1999)  this  opened  a  “window  of  opportunities”:  to-
gether with improvements in the institutional environment
and  investment  climate,  the  financial  crisis  enhanced  the
incentive  structure  and  the  perspective  to  realize  profits
from investing in Russia’s domestic sectors in general and
in agriculture and the food industries in particular.
2 This is
so  because  investments  in  sectors  producing  consumer
goods  that  are  adequate  substitutes  for  imported  goods
became  particularly  more  favorable.  For  instance,  in  the
aftermath  of  the  financial  crisis
non-agricultural  investment  con-
glomerates  started  to  invest
money  in  extremely  large  agro-
holdings. They are characterized
by a high degree of vertical inte-
gration,  normally  operate  under
more  modern  and  western  man-
agement,  make  use  of  private
capital, and are very commercial.
A  survey  of  16  of  these  “new
agricultural operators” conducted
in 2001 in seven Russian regions
in the southern and, hence, most
fertile  area  of  the  country  re-
vealed  an  average  size  of  these
holdings  of  36,000  ha  (RYLKO,
2001).  Similarly  investments  in
domestic food industries rose and
output in this sector of the econ-
omy  grew  in  1999  by  7.5%
(OECD, 2000: 141).
In  response  to  these  develop-
ments  the  total  output  of  wheat
grew from 2000 to 2002 by 42%
and  of  coarse  grains  by  17%.
3
Together with favourable weather
conditions the major components
for this increase were on the one
hand,  an  extension  of  the  har-
vested area from 43 to 46 million
ha,  and  on  the  other  hand  in-
creased  average  yields  per  hec-
tare of 21%. Figure 2 shows the
total  outputs  of  grains  in  the
Russian  Federation  for  the  last
decade.
The  data  indicates  that  Russian
cereal  production  in  1997  had
already  reached  a  production
                                                          
2  In fact this causality is consistent with an analysis by ALGIERI
(2004)  for  the  Russian Federation.  ALGIERI  showed  empiri-
cally the following effects of the Dutch Disease in Russia: a
real exchange rate appreciation, a decline of output in the non-
booming sector, and a  reduction  in  the non-booming  sector
exports.  Assuming  that  agriculture  and  food  industries  are
such non-booming sectors, the Dutch Disease symptoms de-
picted are just the mirror-image of the effects of the real de-
valuation following the financial crisis in 1998.
3  In the following chapters, the term “wheat” includes food and
feed wheat varieties, the term “coarse grains” covers barley,
rye, maize, oats, millet, buckwheat and other coarse grains.
level as high as that of 2001 and 2002. In 1997 the country
was on a gradual growth path which resulted in a signifi-
cant output increase compared with 1996. However, grain
production fell in 1998 to the exceptionally low  level  of
47.9 million  mt (OECD, 2000: 140). In  contrast  to  what
happened in 2001-2002 the significant output  increase  in
1997 did not result in a comparable increase of exports to
2001-2002.  The  explanation  for  this  observation  can  be
found on the demand side, for which some stylized facts are
presented in figure 3. The graph indicates that while food
demand  for  wheat  and  coarse  grain  remained  relatively
stable, feed demand followed a more volatile pattern, espe-
cially  in  1997,  when  it  absorbed  significant  parts  of  the
additional grain output. The remaining surplus of 12 million
mt was stored, an important difference to 2001, when the
surplus was partly stored and partly exported.
In fact, the change in cereal stocks in 2002 increased the
pressure on domestic markets because the marginal increase
in stocks was not sufficient to buffer the significant increase
in production. In an open economy one would expect that
domestic producers in such a situation would increase ex-
ports as long as the margin between domestic and  world
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market  prices  is  sufficiently  high  to  cover  transportation
costs.  Figure  4  shows  the  average  annual  domestic  and
export  prices  for  wheat.  The  difference  between  them  is
regarded as the trade margin, including transportation costs,
export taxes and transaction costs. Another difference be-
tween  the  situation  in  1997-1998  and  2001-2002  is  that
while the cereal stored domestically was taken out of stocks
in 1998, this was impossible in 2002 as grain production
that year was again very high. Hence, the surplus situation
persisted and stocks increased even further (figure 5).
Export  prices  and  domestic  prices  show  similar  dynamic
behaviour,  which  indicates  an  absence  of  strong  govern-
mental influence and a relatively liberal trade regime. Un-
fortunately,  average  annual  prices  for  the  last  two  years
were not yet available. Nevertheless, there is a remarkable
change in trade margins after the crisis, which is likely to
persist into 2001: in 1997, trade costs amounted to 55 US$
per ton and in 2000 only 23 US$, facilitating the transfor-
mation of domestic cereal production into exported quanti-
ties. The different cost-components of cereal trade are diffi-
cult to quantify, but there is some evidence, that transporta-
tion  costs  represent  the  major  part  among  them  (KUHN,
2001).  While  this  absolute  reduction  in  trade  margins  in
1999 was mainly due to the exchange rate effect, the trade
margin narrowed further in 2000. In 2001, the data again
indicates a moderate increase of the trade margin in abso-
lute terms, but in relative terms the margin was much lower
than in the years prior to the financial crisis (i.e. 1996 and
1997). This may be indicative of the fact that the institu-
tional environment in Russia in general but also with re-
spect to the agricultural sector has in fact improved, result-
ing  in  a  reduction  of  transaction  costs.  For  instance,  the
reliability  of  contracts  has
improved in the aftermath of
the  financial  crisis.  On  the
one  hand  this  increases  the
incentives  to  lease  agricul-
tural land. On the other, im-
proved  contract  security
seems to offer grain produc-
ers  better  opportunities  to
ship their cereals to far away
locations where higher prices
may be realized.
From  the  considerations
above  it  can  be  concluded,
that the change in trade posi-
tion  of  the  Russian  Federa-
tion  on  cereal  markets  can
only be explained by a mix of
factors:  favorable  weather
conditions,  the  relatively
more favorable exchange rate
as  if  compared  to  pre-crisis
levels, increased productivity
of  grain  production,  ex-
hausted  storage  capacities,
and  changes  in  real  trade
costs after the devaluation of
the  Russian  Rouble  in  1998





The agricultural sector of the
Russian  Federation  is  still
significantly  influenced  by
various  legacies  of  the  For-
mer  Soviet  Union  (FSU),
where basically two kinds of agricultural producers existed:
the large scale collective and state farms, i.e. the Kolkhozes
and Sovchozes, and the household plots with land areas less
than  one  hectare.  Both  structures  persist  to  this  day,  al-
though the collective and state farms have been restructured
into  new  legal  entities  and  were  partially  devolved  into
private farms. Private farming became an option after the
break up of the FSU in 1992, but due to the poor institu-
tional and investment climate in the rural economy never
became important. The restructuring of the former collec-
tive farms rarely went along with either the introduction of
more  efficient  management  structures  or  the  adoption  of
















Export Price Domestic Price Trade Margin
Export Price: FAOSTAT (Exported value divided by exported quantity)
Domestic Price: GOSKOMSTAT (2001) (Calculated with annual exchange rate)
Trade Margin: Difference between export and domestic price
Source: GOSKOMSTAT (2001) and FAOSTAT, own illustration
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modern western technology. This passive instead of active
restructuring has been one factor that explains why Russia’s
agricultural output did not grow earlier on in the 1990s. The
three  types  of  agricultural  producers  differ  significantly
with respect to their share of the total commod-
ity  output  of  Russia’s  agricultural  sector  and
with  respect  to  the  commodities  they  produce
(table 1).
According to the availability of arable land and
technology,  large-scale  farms  contribute  the
largest production share for cereals, sugar beet
and  sunflower.  Household  plots  produce  the
highest share of potatoes, vegetables, and horti-
cultural products. Meat and milk are produced in
almost equal shares; according to official statis-
tics  egg  production  is  mainly  conducted  by
large-scale  farms.  Private  farms  show  no  out-
standing  contribution  to  any  of  the  considered
commodities; only in cereals and sunflower seed
do they have shares of above 5%. The question,
which farming structure will be affected by the
changes  in  trade  has  not  yet  been  addressed.
Table 2 shows the shares of the different com-
modities in the income composition of the three
types of farms.
Income of private  farms in 2000  depended  on
cereal production by almost 50%, in the case of
large-scale farms by 37%. Household plots get
the  most  significant  part  of  their  incomes  by
growing  potatoes  and  vegetables  (43%).  Alto-
gether,  the  data  indicates  that  the  large-scale
farms  are  mainly  responsible  for  the  observed
increase in cereal production but private farms
might suffer from the drop in prices to a higher
extend.  Household  plots  are  not  affected  by
falling grain prices as only 0.3% of their total
produced  value  is  generated  from  this  crop.
However,  as  they  engage  in  significant  small-
scale  livestock  production,  the  decline  in  feed
prices might indirectly be beneficial to them.
4. Russian grain market policies:
an analysis of economy-wide effects
The described changes in Russia’s grain production and the
respective  consequences  are  currently  subject  to  intense
public debate. Various policies have been proposed includ-
ing direct income support for farmers, governmental grain
purchases and indirect measures such as tariff rate quotas
(TRQ) on meat imports to promote domestic animal produc-
tion thereby increasing domestic demand for feed grains.
In fact, because of the price collapse for grains, an inter-
vention system that seems to be reminiscent of that of the
EU was implemented in late 2002. One million mt of cere-
als were purchased in November 2002 at a cost of 2 billion
Roubles. Assuming an exchange rate of almost 30 Roubles/
US$,  the  respective  average  intervention  price  equaled
about US$ 67 per t.
4 Total government funds for this kind
                                                          
4  The intervention price is probably lower as the purchased quan-
tity refers to 11/13/2002 and the purchased value to 11/20/2002,
of intervention amounted to 6 billion Roubles, which would
correspond to purchases of about 3 million mt or 4% of the
total cereal production in this year assuming the same price
as in November 2002.
The  implementation  of  TRQs  has  to  be  seen  against  the
historical  background:  livestock  production  was  heavily
subsidized  in  the  Former  Soviet  Union  and  consumption
levels  of  meat  were  high  in  absolute  terms  (e.g.  OECD
1998) and far above those of other countries of comparable
income levels (WEHRHEIM and  WIESMANN,  2003).  While
average per capita consumption of meat and meat products
fell between 1990 and 1997 by 32% (from 75 kg per capita
in 1990 to 51 kg in 1997), total meat production plummeted
in the same period by 52% (OECD, 1998: 50 and 57). To
balance the difference, Russia became a major importer of
meat  from  abroad.  Over  1996-2002  average  total  meat
imports were 2.6 million tones (LIEFERT et al., 2003: 18).
Particularly the EU and the US exported subsidized meat in
significant  quantities  to  Russia.  Against  this  background
Russia intends to support its livestock industry and intends
to reduce the quantities of imports originating from subsi-
dized exporters like the EU and the US but also from others
like Brazil. In the context of the WTO accession negotia-
                                                                                                
when a higher quantity will have been purchased. Besides, it is
difficult to compute an average intervention price for ‘grain’
since there are also significant heterogeneities in quality.
Table 2.  Income composition of the different farm types, 2000
Large-scale farming Household plots Private farms
Cereals 37,4% 0,3% 49,3%
Sugarbeet 2,0% 0,0% 1,5%
Sunflowerseed 2,8% 0,0% 6,8%
Potatoes 2,4% 27,6% 5,9%
Vegetables 5,0% 15,6% 7,9%
Meat 15,4% 17,7% 9,8%
Milk 16,5% 14,2% 2,0%
Eggs 7,0% 2,3% 7,6%
Other products 11,3% 22,4% 9,3%
Source: GOSKOMSTAT (2001), own calculation
Table 1.  Contributions of different farming structures to
total output quantities, 2000
Large-scale farming Household plots Private farms
Cereals 90,7% 0,9% 8,4%
Sugarbeet 94,4% 0,7% 4,9%
Sunflowerseed 84,4% 1,4% 14,2%
Potatoes 6,5% 92,4% 1,1%
Vegetables 19,9% 77,9% 2,2%
Meat 40,3% 57,9% 1,8%
Milk 47,3% 50,9% 1,8%
Eggs 70,9% 28,7% 0,4%
Other products 23,6% 72,7% 3,8%
Cereals: All kinds of cereals
Meat: Beef, pork and poultry in slaughter weight.
Other products:  All kinds of products not covered by the categories above,
particularly honey and wool.
Source: GOSKOMSTAT (2001)Agrarwirtschaft 53 (2004), Heft 4
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tions the Russian  Ministry  of  Agriculture  is  requesting  a
TRQ  of  0.5  to  0.8  million  mt  for  poultry  (LIEFERT  and
OSBORNE, 2002) or 44% to 70% of the imported quantity in
2000. In April 2003 the Russian Ministry for Agriculture
introduced TRQ which were prolonged for 2004. 90% of
these quotas were allocated to importers according to his-
torical imports between 2000 and 2003.
5 Another 10% are
planned  to  be  sold  in  an  auction  in  early  2004  (DBM,
2004). It should be noted that already prior to these quotas
becoming effective the dairy and meat industry had become
the  most  dynamic  ones  in  Russia’s  agro-food  sector:  in
2002 (in 2003) the output of the dairy and meat sector grew
by 10.5% (7%) (DBM, 2004). Given the significant back-
ward  linkages  between  meat  and  cereal  production  (i.e.
high demand for feed cereals as a major input for domestic
livestock production) any significant changes in the  live-
stock sector will have substantial effects on Russia’s cereal
markets as well.
With the aim of investigating the effects of the above men-
tioned policy developments on cereal markets, an economy-
wide,  so-called  computable  general  equilibrium  model
(CGE  model),  that  was  developed  and  used  earlier  by
WEHRHEIM  (2003)  and  WEHRHEIM  and  WOBST,  (forth-
coming), was adapted and updated for the analyses in this
study. The major characteristics and structure of the model
and its database will be described in the following section
and  in  box  1.  This  modeling  approach  has  been  chosen
because of the relatively high contribution of agriculture to
Gross Domestic Product (GDP), the high expenditure share
of  households  on  food,  and  the  relatively  high  share  of
agro-food items in total imports. Agricultural sector poli-
cies are likely to have significant economy-wide repercus-
sions (see table 3) and the important role of the agricultural
sector  as  provider  of  employment  should  be  taken  into
account  while  analyzing  this  particular  sector.  Given  the
kind of policies discussed, they are also expected to have
notable  fiscal  implications.  Furthermore,  the  model  can
help to identify partial sectoral repercussions  such as the
linkages between meat and grain markets or the effects of
different  policy  approaches  on  the  three  different  farm
types.
4.1 Model characteristics and structure
The model used here belongs to a family of CGE models,
which was developed by the Division for Macroeconomics
and Trade at the International Food Policy Research Insti-
tute (IFPRI) in Washington, D.C. A non-technical summary
of the model’s feature is given in box 1.
The major characteristics of the Russia model are the fol-
lowing:
! Comparative  –  static:  different  policy  options  or  ex-
pected developments can be simulated and compared with
the  benchmark  solution  of  the  base  year  (i.e.  1999).
Hence, dynamic developments of any variable in the Rus-
sian economy are not taken into account.
                                                          
5  The annual import quotas for beef and pork will be 420 000
and 450 000 mt, respectively. The enlarged EU (the US) will
be granted quotas of 331 800 (17 200) mt beef and 227 300
(42 200) mt of pork. The import quota for poultry amounts to
1 050 million mt of which 771 900 mt was allocated to the US
and 205 000 to the enlarged EU.
! General  equilibrium:  the  model  represents  the  entire
income flow of the Russian economy in the base year at a
highly  aggregated  level.  Production  sectors,  consumers
and the government are represented separately and inter-
linked by commodity-markets and by factor-markets for
labor  and  capital.  The  system  is  completed  by  macro-
economic  equilibrium  conditions,  for  instance  the  sav-
ings-investment identity, which “close” the system. Do-
mestic prices and factor costs, such as wages, are calcu-
lated endogenously.
! Theoretical  and  empirical  consistency:  the  system  of
behavioral  and  general  equilibrium  equations  complies
with Walras’ law which assures theoretical consistency.
All income flows in the economy are based on the double-
book-keeping approach of national accounting which as-
sures the empirical consistency of the model.
! Deterministic: random effects are not covered.
! Partly  synthetic:  although  most  parameters  (such  as
share parameters) can be calibrated directly from the base
year data (social accounting matrix, SAM, see next chap-
ter), some  have to be  taken  from  the  literature  (for  in-
stance trade elasticities).
Similar to WEHRHEIM and WOBST (2003) Russia’s agricul-
tural sector is disaggregated first by institutional character-
istics, i.e. the types of farms as described in chapter 3.
! large scale farms  (LSF)
! household plots  (LPH)
! private farms  (PRIV)
These farm types produce the following commodities:
! cereals  (CERE)
! sugar beet  (SGBT)
! sunflower seed (SUNF)
! potato (POTA)




! raw milk  (MILK)
! fresh eggs  (EGGS)
! all other agricultural products (OAGR)
The  distinction  between  agricultural  production  activities
and farms is an important innovation in such an economy-
wide model because it allows not only the identification of
the  effects  of  exogenous  general  and  commodity-specific
policy changes on agricultural commodity markets, but ad-
ditionally the aggregate effects on different types of farms.
4.2 Database
In order to represent the complete set of economic activities
of a country in a given year, general equilibrium models
rely  mainly on the  national  accounting  system,  including
the production accounts, the balance of payments, the cur-
rent  account  of  the  government  etc.  A  convenient  way
of  arranging  this  multi-facetted  data  base  is  a  Social
Accounting Matrix (SAM). In this matrix the accounts of
all “social institutions” (e.g. producers, markets, the gov-
ernment, households, and the rest of the world) are com-
bined in one symmetric table. The  requirement  of  a  bal-
anced system is fulfilled when the expenditures and reve-
nues  of  each  social  account  are  balanced.  Therefore,  theAgrarwirtschaft 53 (2004), Heft 4
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sum of table-rows (representing the revenues of each social
account)  has  to  equal  the  sum  of  the  respective  table-
columns  (representing  the  expenditures  of  each  social
account). In order to be able to analyse the latest develop-
ments in Russia’s grain markets, a major task has been to
update the SAM developed and described by WEHRHEIM
(2003a) for 1994 to a more recent year. The most recent,
comprehensive  and  available  dataset  referred  to  the  year
1999 (GOSKOMSTAT, 2002), providing information about
trade  and  domestic  production  values.  The  demand  for
intermediate inputs is represented in an input-output table
(IOT), which was available for the same year.
6
                                                          
6  The reliability of official data from the Russian Federation has
improved significantly in the course of transition. Neverthe-
less, caveats remain such as inaccuracies in the measurement
of agricultural production by types of producers or the exact
amount of agricultural trade. However, in the context of this
study we had to rely on official data as no other consistent
data set for economy-wide analyses is available.
Box 1.  Important features of the model
Standard CGE model along the lines of models as described in LÖFGREN et al. (2002).
Major actors in the economy: producers, one representative household, the central government, a savings/investments account,
and the rest of the world.
Behavioral design of the production side: producers minimize their costs under the conditions of a neoclassical production func-
tion. Intermediates are used according to sectorally specified and fixed input output coefficients. Substitution between labor and
capital is specified with a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) function. Value-added prices are determined as the difference
between sectoral unit revenues and unit costs for intermediates. Producers maximize their revenues from domestic sales and exports
under the restriction of a constant elasticity of transformation (CET) function.
Behavioral design of the demand side: consumers maximize their utility under the restriction of a budget constraint. Final demand
of households for consumption goods is determined through a linear expenditure system (LES) using fixed minimum expenditure
quantities and fixed marginal expenditure shares. Subsistence demand is an important component of total household consumption.
The LES demand system combines composite goods with subsistence goods. While the composite goods are sold via the commodity
markets (valued at consumer prices), the subsistence goods originate directly from the agriculture and food-processing activities,
because of which no marketing margins have to be paid (valued at producer prices). The marketed commodities are composite
goods comprising of domestic and imported goods using a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) function. This represents the
Armington assumption, which implies that home and foreign goods are imperfect substitutes.
Domestic prices for imported commodities are determined by respective world market prices, the exchange rate and tariffs. The
model assumes perfectly elastic import supply (small country assumption). Consumer prices are the weighted average of domestic
product and import prices.
Government receives revenues from import tariffs, export taxes, and indirect production taxes, as well as direct income taxes. Gov-
ernment demand is determined using fixed shares of aggregate real spending, while the budget surplus is defined as the difference
between revenues and government demand for goods.
World market prices are exogenous, domestic import and export prices depend on world market prices, tariff and export tax rates,
as well as the exchange rate.
Determination of equilibrium: changes in relative prices and substitution possibilities determine supply, demand and trade. If
relative prices change, substitution can take place between factors of production, export supply and domestic supply, imports and
domestically produced imperfect substitutes, and different commodities in demand. Export demand is price elastic, which is par-
ticularly important for Russia’s energy sector. Domestic export prices depend on their respective f.o.b. prices in foreign currency
(US$), the export subsidy and the exchange rate. All prices in the model are determined as relative prices and no monetary market is
explicitly modeled. Out of n prices in each sector (e.g., import price, producer price, etc.) n-1 prices are linear dependent from other
prices. Hence prices have to be defined in relation to some exogenously determined price. Here, the domestic sales price index is
kept constant and used as the numeraire.
Macro-closures: we have chosen a standard specification in order to keep the causality in the model economy straightforward. The
balance of trade is equilibrated through a flexible exchange rate, as the Russian rouble has significantly adjusted to changes in the
international competitiveness of the Russian economy in the second half of the 1990s (c.f. POGANIETZ, 2000). With respect to final
demand we have chosen the so-called “balanced closure” (LÖFGREN et al., 2002): the shares of private and government consumption
and investment demand in total absorption have been kept constant.
Modeling transition-specific features in the model
Reduced mobility of resources: our short run experiments reflect some of the features characteristic for the Russian economy in
transition by reducing the full mobility of economic resources. The result is a combination of standard neo-classical behavior with
economic features of imperfect markets or structural rigidities. Therefore, our model could be best classified by “neo-classical
structuralism” (ROBINSON, 1989).
Representing subsistence demand: for each sector we differentiate between the production in producer prices and sales in con-
sumer prices. This allows making a distinction between subsistence demand from sectors (at producer prices) and demand from
markets (in consumer prices).
Disaggregation of the primary agricultural sector: we distinguish three agricultural sub-sectors by type of producers (former
collective farms, household producers, and private family farms).
Transaction costs: we explicitly included sector-specific transaction costs in the model which affect the efficiency of specific sec-
tors. For instance, subsistence farming sells little to the market because transaction costs to reach the market in our model are rela-
tively higher than those for commercial agricultural producers.
Source: based on model description in WEHRHEIM and WOBST (forthcoming)Agrarwirtschaft 53 (2004), Heft 4
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Table 3 shows the results, the com-
position of GDP and the total pro-
duction  value  of  all  major  sectors
represented in the model, as well as
their  respective  shares  in  the  total
national  payments  made  that  year
for labour and capital. The highest
share  in  GDP  is  generated  by  the
service sector, followed by agricul-
ture,  which  still  generates  9%  of
GDP. Furthermore, the data reveals
one  important  result  of  the  transi-
tion process in as far as after a dec-
ade of restructuring, the household
plots are the  most important  farm-
ing  structure  within  Russia’s  agri-
cultural sector, generating 5.9%  of
the  national  income  and  paying
10.4% of the national expenditures
for  labor.
7  Comparing  the  labour
intensity  of  large-scale  and  house-
hold  farming  it  becomes  evident,
that the former is  more  capital  in-
tensive  while  the  latter  is  more
labour intensive, which is a plausi-
ble  representation  of  one  of  the
most  distinct  differences  of  the
production  structure  of  both  farm
types.
Summing  up,  the  structure  of  the
economy  represented  by  the  data
base  in  the  model  resembles  im-
portant  structural  features  of  the
Russian economy in general and the agricultural sector in
particular as it is reported by official data sources.
4.3 Simulations
The base year for all simulations is 1999. All changes of
variables in response to any of the exogenous policy simu-
lations will be given in relation to this base year as percent-
age changes. In order to investigate the effects of the in-
creased cereal production in the aftermath of Russia’s fi-
nancial crisis, the first simulation (exp. 1) will address the
effects of a productivity increase of cereal production by
55% as happened between 1999 and 2002. The second and
third scenario will deal with the implementation of TRQs
on imports of raw (exp. 2) and processed meat (exp. 3),
which will be compared with a fourth scenario (exp. 4) in
which  foreign  trade  related  costs  will  be  decreased.  The
latter could be the result of increased investments in foreign
                                                          
7  One may argue that owners of household plots do not make
any  payments  for  labor  as  they  pay  no  wages  nor  are  any
monetary transactions involved. However, it is quite evident
that  income  in  kind  is  generated  from  the  household  plots
which can be mainly attributed for the labor input of the op-
erators of the household plots. If one computes the value of
the production of food, using prices from neighboring  mar-
kets, one can also calculate a monetary estimate of the associ-
ated  income  flow.  Because  households  are  consumers  and
producers alike, one can thereby also approximate the share of
the production costs that is due to the labor input of the house-
hold plot operators.
trade-related  infrastructure  (e.g.  better  harbor  facilities
etc.).
8 The fifth scenario (exp. 5) relates to a more theoreti-
cal debate in the ongoing negotiations for the Russian WTO
accession. Here, further liberalization of Russia’s agricul-
tural trade system is discussed. However, because the level
of agricultural trade protection in the base year was modest,
we simulate  an  extreme  form  of  further  liberalization  by
abolishing all agricultural trade barriers represented in the
model (exp. 5).
9 Direct grain market interventions will not
be  simulated  since  the  proposed  intervention  volume  is
relatively  low  (4%  of  produced  quantity,  see  above)  and
because the computational effort to implement such a sce-
nario would be high.
The simulations are conducted under different assumptions
concerning  the  mobility  of  labor  and  capital  in  order  to
                                                          
8  It should be noted that the exogenous shock imposed by exp. 1
and 4 would be associated with private and/or public invest-
ments. Because the specific amount of such investments could
be based on speculation only, we did not include this in the
design  of  the  experiments.  Therefore,  care  should  be  taken
when interpreting the results as they do not adequately reflect
the change in the government budget.
9  It should be noted that in the model only tariff barriers to trade
are included. In the WTO negotiations non-tariff barriers to
trade also receive a lot of attention. For instance, administra-
tive  regulations  of  regional  governments  or  sanitary  and
phyto-sanitary measures imposed on food trade might in prac-
tice limit the amount of imports for specific agro-food com-
modities.
Table 3.  Structure of the Russian economy by activities for 1999, in %
GDPFC PROD LABSHR CAPSHR
Industries Electric power 3,4 3,4 3,2 3,6
Fuel 7,5 8,5 3,7 10,2
Metall 7,0 8,2 4,2 8,9
Chemicals 2,2 2,8 1,9 2,4
Machinery 5,4 1,7 5,6 0,4
Wood 1,8 1,9 1,8 1,8
Light manufacturing 0,6 0,9 0,8 0,4
Construction 8,2 7,6 9,3 7,5
Other Industries 0,9 6,7 2,7 4,6
Food Industries Sugar refineries 0,3 0,5 0,3 0,4
Flourmilling 1,1 1,9 0,9 1,2
Meatprocessing 1,0 1,7 0,8 1,1
Dairyproduction 0,6 1,3 0,5 0,7
Other food production 1,2 1,9 1,0 1,4
Animal feed production 0,2 0,2 0,1 0,2
Agriculture Large scale farming 2,9 3,2 1,9 3,6
Household plots 5,9 4,5 10,4 2,8
Private farming 0,2 0,2 0,2 0,2
Services Trade and Transport 28,5 23,6 12,1 40,0
Other Services 21,1 19,2 38,8 8,8
Totals Total Agriculture 9,0 7,9 12,5 6,6
Total Non-Agriculture 91,0 92,1 87,5 93,4
Total 100 100 100 100
GDPFC: GDP at factor cost
PROD: Total production value
LABSHR: Share in total payments for labour
CAPSHR: Share in total payments for capital
Source: own calculation based on WEHRHEIM (2003) and GOSKOMSTAT (2002)Agrarwirtschaft 53 (2004), Heft 4
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compare the effects of certain policy measures against the
background of a fully flexible and a somehow rigid econ-
omy. In the first case, which resembles a short run scenario,
labor and capital are bound to remain in agricultural or non-
agricultural sectors, respectively, but they may move within
those  sector-aggregates  (see  table 4).  In  the  second  case
which resembles a long run scenario labor and capital can
move from one productive sector into another without any
restriction  (see  table  5).
10  Unemployment  is  not  incorpo-
rated. Even though this is a deviation from the real world,
this specification can be justified by the observation, that
labour markets in the Russian economy after the financial
crisis hit the country in 1998 have proven to be more flexi-
ble than for instance in many countries of western Europe:
according to official statistics (GOSKOMSTAT, 2002) the
unemployment rate in  Russia dropped between 1999 and
2002 (last  quarter)  from  12.5  to  7.0%  and  thereby  is  by
1.4 percentage  points  lower  than  the  EU  average  (WIRT-
SCHAFTSWOCHE  6/2003).  Table  4  and  5  summarize  the
results  for  the  short  term  and  long  term  version  of  the
model, respectively.
11
4.3.1 Increase of grain productivity (exp. 1)
As mentioned above, it is assumed that a combination of
various factors such as favorable  weather conditions, im-
proved management practices, and the real depreciation of
the Rouble have induced the marked production increase of
grains in the years 2000-2002. These effects together are
simulated  here  as  an  exogenous  shock  that  consists  of  a
productivity increase of 55% in the cereal sector only. Be-
cause our data-base refers to 1999 and official data on the
trends in Russia’s cereal sector for the consecutive years is
already available from statistical sources we can challenge
the  results  of  our  model  simulations  against  real  world
developments.  The  significant  increase  of  productivity
which was exogenously imposed on our model economy is
unlikely to have materialized within one year only. Under
the assumption, that it reflects the cumulative effect of a
medium-term  period,  e.g.  three  years,  we  compare  the
model results with observed cumulative changes on Russian
grain markets between 1999 and 2002 which are available
from USDA sources (ERS, 2002). Hence, in addition to the
economic repercussions this experiment reveals, the results
of this scenario show that both the direction and the degree
of the model results are relatively realistic. The deviations
between  our  model  simulations  and  the  respective  real-
world changes as reported by USDA are shown in table 6.
                                                          
10  The second case could be considered to resemble a more long-
term perspective as it assumes that structural rigidities which
reduce the mobility of both, labor and capital, are abolished.
This could be accomplished in the long run through consecu-
tive improvements in the institutional environment which re-
lax, for instance, the restrictions of people from rural areas to
settle in urban centres such as Moscow and St. Petersburg. In
fact, at the moment requirements such as this one continue to
prevent a more significant influx of labor into these two major
cities of the Russian Federation.
11  In tables 4 and 5 we report results of the simulations only for a
selection of variables. Additionally, in the text we report re-
sults for a few additional variables in cases when such infor-
mation seems relevant.
The similarity in the scope of economic changes is evident,
for instance, if one compares the change in grain produc-
tion: both USDA data sources as well as our model simula-
tions show an increase of grain production in the Russian
Federation  of  about  55%.  Because  human  consumption
combined  with  other  domestic  uses  increased  to  a  much
lower extent, USDA data and our model results indicate a
significant  increase  in  exports.  According  to  USDA  data
export quantities grew by 1 313% in this period. In both the
mobile and the rigid specification of our model, the trans-
formation of domestically produced quantities into exported
quantities is lower but also amounts to almost 1 000%. The
same applies for the import-side, for which the effects in
our model are more moderate: while the USDA data reveals
a decline of 82%, our model results are  with about 40%
more moderate. In spite of these deviations, it is important
that  the  model  results  replicate  the  direction  of  changes
correctly. Furthermore, it has to be noted that the real-world
developments shown in the table are responses to a com-
plex set of changes, which may have happened in the real
world between 1999 and 2002 simultaneously. In contrast
the comparative-static character of our model reveals only
the  effects  of  isolated  exogenous  developments.  For  in-
stance, it is likely that not only the productivity of cereal
production improved between 1999 and 2002 but also the
trade infrastructure. Hence, the transformation of domestic
production into traded quantities has been facilitated, and
this has not been incorporated in this model simulation. It
should  also  be  stressed,  that  the  model  calculations  are
based  on  values,  while  the  USDA  calculations  refer  to
quantities. This would be irrelevant only as long as prices
remain the same within the observed period. Based on this
discussion, it can be concluded, that while the simulation
results adequately reflect real-world trends in Russian ce-
real  markets,  some  differences  with  real  world  develop-
ments remain. They  have to be  taken  into  account  when
interpreting the model results.
Before moving on to the next simulation, it seems worth-
while to have a look at some other endogenous changes of
the model simulation, i.e. the price effects which coincide
with the change in Russia’s trade position, which is also a
result of the experiment. The simulations show a reduction
of  the  domestic  producer  cereal  price by  around  47%  in
both model versions. According to the information on the
structure of cereal production presented in chapter 3, this
would harm the large-scale farms and to a higher degree
than private farmers because the latter generate 49% and
the former 38% of their total income by producing cereals.
One remarkable result of the short term simulation of exp. 1
is the decrease in employment in the private farming sector
by 13% (not reported in table 4). Because  in  this  model
specification  we did  not  allow  labor  shifts  between  agri-
cultural and non-agricultural sectors the drop of marginal
productivity in the private farm sector is compensated by
shifts of labor towards the household plots. This resembles
another real world development, namely that the household
plot sector can under certain circumstances  function as a
sink for the rural labor force which is released from large-
scale agricultural enterprises.
Also the feedbacks on the GDP should be mentioned: the
increased productivity in cereal production causes (ceterisAgrarwirtschaft 53 (2004), Heft 4
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paribus)  a  small  but  remarkable  growth  of  0.7%  in  both
model specifications.
12 This is a contradiction to the above
                                                          
12  After exposing our model to an exogenous shock it has to find
a new equilibrium solution. Standard exogenous policy shocks
should yield an equilibrium that is located on the economy-
mentioned  suffering  of  the
agricultural sector from low
cereal  prices,  but  the  econ-
omy  as  a  whole  takes  ad-
vantages from this develop-
ment because of the lowered
input  costs  for  cereal-
demanding  sectors  such  as
flour-milling  and  animal
breeding.
The  next  simulations  are
conducted  under  the  as-
sumption,  that  the  Russian
government  will  attempt  to
limit  the  negative  price  ef-
fects that coincided with the
change of the country’s  net
trade position in cereal mar-
kets.  Therefore,  the  results
of all additional simulations
will not refer directly to the
base  year  1999.  Instead  we
will  report  the  cumulative
changes  of  exp.  1  plus  the
individual policy experiment
under discussion.
4.3.2 Implementation of TRQs
on meat imports
Tariff  rate  quotas  were  im-
plemented  in  the  model  in
the following way. First, by
introducing  a  prohibitively
high  tariff  (three  times  the
level of the base period) on
meat imports, if the imports
become  higher  than  62.5%
of the real world imports in
2000  –  a  percentage  some-
where between the 44 – 70%
claimed  by  the  Russian
Ministry  of  Agriculture  in
the  WTO  negotiation  proc-
ess. As the base year of the
model is 1999, the imported
quantities,  which  would
cause the implementation of
TRQs  were  adjusted  to  the
level of the year 2000, when
the imports of beef and pork
were much lower and hence,
the TRQs would apply at a
comparatively  low  level  of
quantity imported. Second, a
tariff  on  processed  meat  of
70% (20% in 1999) is intro-
duced if the simulated imports of this commodity exceed
80% of the base year values (1999). Because these policies
                                                                                                
wide production possibility frontier. Only in the case of pro-
ductivity increases we can expect some more significant in-
crease of GDP.
Table 4.  Simulation results based on short term specification of

























Variables Bill. US$ change to base period in %
Macroeconomic results:
GDP at market prices 154,7 0,7 0,7 0,6 0,7 0,7
Household income 96,2 1,3 1,4 1,7 1,4 -0,2
Household consumption,
of which
73,4 1,0 0,9 0,3 0,9 2,1
   Market demand 67,7 1,0 1,0 0,3 1,0 2,2
   Subsistence demand 5,6 0,0 0,0 -0,1 0,0 0,2
Government budget -4,4 1,4 1,3 -5,5 1,8 74,0
Exports 75,2 -0,2 -0,2 -0,7 -0,2 2,2
Imports 44,3 -0,4 -0,4 -1,2 -0,4 3,7
Exchange rate 1,0 0,6 0,6 0,2 0,5 0,6
Consumer Price Index 1,1 0,4 0,4 1,4 0,3 -2,1
Sector-specific results:
Export prices
   Cereals 1,0 0,6 0,6 0,2 4,9 0,5
   Beef 1,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
   Pork 1,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
   Poultry 1,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
Export
   Cereals 0,1 991,7 991,4 987,2 1030,1 1016,6
   Beef 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
   Pork 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
   Poultry 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
Import prices
   Cereals 1,0 0,6 0,6 0,2 0,5 -4,0
   Beef 1,1 0,6 38,9 0,2 0,5 -12,1
   Pork 1,1 0,6 44,4 0,2 0,5 -14,0
   Poultry 1,1 0,6 0,6 0,2 0,5 0,6
Imports
   Cereals 0,8 -42,6 -42,6 -42,7 -41,3 -40,9
   Beef 0,0 4,0 -26,0 19,5 4,2 11,5
   Pork 0,0 4,5 -29,3 20,7 4,5 14,6
   Poultry 0,0 4,1 3,7 11,3 4,2 0,0
Value added price
   Large scale farms 1,0 7,2 7,4 10,8 8,1 1,3
   Household plots 1,0 7,5 7,7 11,2 8,2 1,6
   Private farms 1,0 7,3 7,6 11,0 8,1 1,4
Domestic production
   Cereals 2,8 55,4 55,4 54,9 56,3 55,2
   Beef 1,4 0,2 0,2 0,3 0,2 0,1
   Pork 1,6 0,2 0,2 0,2 0,1 0,1
   Poultry 1,0 0,2 0,2 0,3 0,2 0,1
Household demand, market
   Cereals 0,9 0,0 -0,5 -3,5 -0,1 2,4
   Beef 1,0 -0,1 -0,4 -3,7 -0,2 2,3
   Pork 0,8 0,0 0,0 -1,9 -0,1 1,4
   Poultry 0,8 0,0 0,0 0,1 -0,1 1,7
Note:  Results for exp. 1 are percentage change in comparison to base year (=1999). Results for all
consecutive experiments are the cumulative effects of experiment 1 plus the respective ex-
ogenous shock simulated with the respective experiment.
Source:own simulation results based on economy-wide model for the Russian Federation.Agrarwirtschaft 53 (2004), Heft 4
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are aimed to support the domestic livestock industry and
thereby also induce additional demand for domestic cereals,
we will also discuss the respective changes in feed consump-
tion.
TRQs on beef, pork, and
poultry (exp. 2)
With  the  more  flexible
specification  of  our  model
economy  (i.e.  the  long-run
version  of  the  model;  see
table 6), the introduction of
TRQs  on  raw  meat,  causes
the imports of beef and pork
to decline by approximately
30%,  those  of  poultry  are
affected only marginally. As
the  producer  price  for  beef
increases  by  1.3%  but  pro-
duction by 1.6%, a relatively
high  price-elasticity  of  sup-
ply is revealed. Again this is
in line with what one would
expect  due  to  the  long  run
specification  of  the  model.
In spite of this positive sup-
ply response, feed demand is
not higher. Consequently, no
significantly higher prices in
domestic cereal markets can
be observed.
The  results  obtained  when
simulating  the  introduction
of tariff rate quotas for raw
meat (exp. 2) with the first,
i.e. the less flexible model are
notably different: imports of
beef  and  pork  decrease  by
26% and 30%, respectively,
while  poultry  imports  in-
crease  by  almost  4%.  Pro-
ducer  prices  for  beef  and
poultry increase between 4%
and  6%  as  compared  to  the
base  year  but  there  is  no
significant change in domes-
tic production of these prod-
ucts, as it would be expected
under  a  short-run  scenario.
Therefore  and  similarly  to
the  long  run  scenario,  this
policy  experiment  does  not
result  in  higher  domestic
cereal demand and also has
no  stabilizing  effects  on
cereal  prices.  However,
the  main  explanation  for
these  effects  is  the  small
share  of  raw  meat  imports
in  total  domestic  consump-
tion  in  the  base  period
(around  1%  in  all  cases).
In fact, in 1999 the major part of meat  was imported as
processed  meat,  hence  trade  policies  affecting  the  trade
regime  for  this  commodity  group  may  have  a  stronger
impact.
Table 5.  Simulation results based on long term specification of economy-wide

























Variables Bill. US$ change to base period in %
Macroeconomic results:
GDP at market prices 154,7 0,6 0,6 0,5 0,7 0,6
Household income 26,6 -1,0 -1,1 -1,8 -1,2 -10,6
Household consumption,
of which
73,4 1,3 1,3 0,9 1,4 2,0
   Market demand 67,7 1,4 1,4 1,0 1,5 2,1
   Subsistence demand 5,6 0,2 0,2 0,2 0,2 0,2
Government budget -4,4 -1,9 -2,1 -10,6 -1,8 74,4
Exports 75,2 -0,3 -0,3 -0,8 -0,3 2,2
Imports 44,3 -0,5 -0,5 -1,4 -0,5 3,7
Exchange rate 1,0 1,0 1,0 0,9 1,0 0,5
Consumer Price Index 1,1 0,0 0,0 0,8 0,0 -2,0
Sector-specific results:
Export prices
   Cereals 1,0 1,0 1,0 0,9 5,4 0,5
   Beef 1,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
   Pork 1,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
   Poultry 1,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
Export
   Cereals 0,1 974,1 975,2 991,8 1020,0 951,0
   Beef 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
   Pork 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
   Poultry 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
Import prices
   Cereals 1,0 1,0 1,0 0,9 1,0 -4,1
   Beef 1,1 1,0 39,5 0,9 1,0 -12,1
   Pork 1,1 1,0 45,0 0,9 1,0 -14,1
   Poultry 1,1 1,0 1,0 0,9 1,0 0,5
Imports
   Cereals 0,8 -41,8 -41,8 -41,8 -40,4 -40,3
   Beef 0,0 0,4 -28,7 12,3 0,1 12,1
   Pork 0,0 0,7 -32,0 13,0 0,3 15,4
   Poultry 0,0 0,2 -0,2 4,6 -0,1 0,6
Value added price
   Large scale farms 1,0 1,1 1,1 1,0 1,1 2,3
   Household plots 1,0 1,3 1,3 1,3 1,3 2,4
   Private farms 1,0 1,2 1,2 1,1 1,2 2,3
Domestic production
   Cereals 2,8 55,4 55,5 56,6 56,8 51,6
   Beef 1,4 1,5 1,6 2,4 1,7 -0,2
   Pork 1,6 1,5 1,6 2,4 1,7 -0,2
   Poultry 1,0 1,5 1,6 2,4 1,7 -0,2
Household demand, market
   Cereals 0,9 1,4 1,0 -1,3 1,5 2,1
   Beef 1,0 1,3 1,1 -1,5 1,5 2,0
   Pork 0,8 1,4 1,6 0,4 1,6 1,1
   Poultry 0,8 1,8 1,9 3,2 2,0 1,3
Note:  Results for exp. 1 are percentage change in comparison to base year (= 1999).
Results for all consecutive experiments are the cumulative effects of experiment 1 plus the
respective exogenous shock simulated with the respective experiment.
Source:own simulation results based on economy-wide model for the Russian FederationAgrarwirtschaft 53 (2004), Heft 4
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TRQs on processed meat (exp. 3)
The direct effect of an import tariff of 70% on processed
meat in a situation in which the imported quantity exceeds
80% of the base year’s level is a significant decline of proc-
essed meat imports of about 27% in both, the long run and
the short-run  model specification. This is partly compen-
sated by higher domestic production (2% in the long run,
8% in the short run). The differences of the results indicate,
that the producers of processed meat are much more flexi-
ble towards changes in the prices of their product than ani-
mal breeders, but the increase in domestic production is not
a  sustainable  development  and  there  are  no  significant
feedbacks  on  the  domestic  animal  production,  which  in-
creases by only 2.5% in the long run. Hence, there is no
effect on the domestic feed demand and no positive price-
effect  on  the  cereal  markets.  In  contrast,  one  of  the  ex-
pected  negative  effect  of  such  a  policy  measure  is  quite
distinct: consumers have to pay higher prices for their proc-
essed meat, which together with other effects leads to an
increase  of  the  consumer  price  index  (CPI)  by  0.8%  as
compared with the base period.
In summary, the results of exp. 2 and 3 indicate that tariff-
rate quotas for  raw  and  processed  meat  products  are  not
suitable measures to stabilize domestic producer prices in
cereal markets. Even a combination of TRQ for both prod-
uct categories  will  mainly  harm  consumers  and  does  not
promise significant gains for the agricultural producers in
any of the farming structures. Because many grain produc-
ers recently had to limit their grain exports due to a lack of
export facilities for grains in the major export harbors of
the country, the next section will address this issue.
4.3.3 Improvement of trade infrastructure (exp. 4)
In this simulation, the trade costs for cereal exports were
decreased by 50%. As mentioned above, this could be the
result of an improvement in harbor infrastructure - a proc-
ess which has been initiated both by private grain trading
companies as well as the federal and regional government
in  the  Russian  Federation.  It  should  be  noted  that  ‘total
trade costs’ consist of domestic transportation, handling and
shipping at the point of sale, and thereby also other costs
such as contract security, information on prices and trade
partners etc. It also should be taken into account that the
share of trade costs in relation to the domestic producer price
depends highly on the traded commodity (KUHN, 2001).
The simulation results indicate that a decrease in trade costs
would indeed stimulate additional exports (increase in the
long term and the short run version by above 1 020%, com-
pared to the other experiments, where export increase by
some 900%). This reduces the pressure on domestic mar-
kets that has been induced by the increase in production.
Hence, domestic producer prices for cereals would decline
to a lower extent than in the previous experiments. At the
same time the CPI increases to a lower degree in the short
run and even decreases in the long run, compared to the
first scenario, in which the cereal output was adapted to the
situation in 2001/2002. In comparison to the introduction of
TRQ  in  particular,  consumers  would  be  better  off,  since
such  a  policy  would  lower  and  not  increase  consumer
prices. Hence, it can be concluded that such a policy would
not only yield favorable results for producers but also for
consumers.
4.3.4 Trade liberalization (exp. 5)
With the following experiment we will simulate a complete
abolition of all agricultural trade policies that were in place
in 1999. This experiment is not simulated because it would
be a very likely policy scenario but to contrast the previous
experiments  particularly  the  interventionist  policies  of
simulation 2 and 3 with a free-trade scenario. Hence, while
a complete abolition of agricultural trade policies is neither
an option currently discussed with respect to Russia’s agri-
cultural sector, nor in any other country, it can highlight the
trade-offs  of  such  policies  for  the  different  actors  in
Russia’s economy.
The  most  significant  outcome  obtained  with  both  model
specifications is a significant decrease of the CPI and an
expected  increase  in  total  trade  volume  (overall  exports
2.2%,  imports  3.7%).  Hence,  consumers  would  benefit
from  agricultural  trade  liberalization.  The  results  for  the
various types of farms differ according to the model speci-
fication. The main difference between both specifications is
related to the development of value added for the different
farm sectors. In the short run, the simulated trade liberali-
zation has negative impacts on all farm sectors. Trade liber-
alization  would  compensate  the  gains,  realized  from  the
higher  productivity  of  cereal  production  simulated  with
exp. 1. As expected, the negative effects of liberalization
for  farmers  are  higher  than  the  positive  effects  from  the
TRQs or the decline of trade costs. However, while all of
the  protectionist  measures  did  not  cause  any  significant
gains for any types of farmers under the long run scenario,
trade liberalization  would  yield  positive  results  when  the
long run  version of the  model is used. Hence,  under  the
conditions of a flexible economy trade liberalization would
be the first best policy option.
5. Policy conclusions and outlook
In this paper we provided an overview on the most recent
developments in Russian cereal markets. A review of an-
nual statistics on domestic production, trade, consumption,
and storage of cereals revealed, that the respective change
in Russia’s net trade position cannot only be explained by
increased  productivity  of  grain  producers.  Instead  ex-
hausted storage capacities, the depreciation of the Rouble
itself  and  the  associated  reduction  in  real  trade  costs
following the devaluation of the Russian Rouble in 1998
seem to have contributed to these developments. It should
be noted that due to the high share of natural resources in
Table 6.  Statistically observed and simulated
changes of Russian grain markets from
1999 to 2002
Observed Mobile Rigid
Production 55% 55% 55%
Import -82% -42% -43%
Export 1313% 974% 992%
Consumption 19% 4% 3%
Source:  “Observed”  changes  from  USDA  and  “simulated”
changes from own model simulations (exp.1)Agrarwirtschaft 53 (2004), Heft 4
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Russia’s exports the country is faced by the threat of Dutch
Disease symptoms (cf. ALGIERI, 2004 and OECD, 2000). In
the aftermath of the financial crisis the Rouble has continu-
ously appreciated in real terms again which will also reduce
the effectiveness of the macro-economic shield against food
imports and thereby reduces the relative competitiveness of
Russia’s domestic agro-food sectors again. This trend may
only be counter-acted if productivity growth in the coun-
try’s agricultural sector improves substantially (LIEFERT et
al., 2003).
An economy-wide model (a general equilibrium model) has
been adapted to serve as a tool for analyzing some of the
major policy instruments currently debated in Russia and to
assess  quantitatively  the  most  important  economic  re-
sponses in more detail. Using the model we were able to
show that some of the policies currently under discussion
are  less  useful  than  others,  and  that  their  consequences
differ significantly depending on  the  time  horizon.  Espe-
cially  simulations  concerning  trade  liberalization  have
shown, that in the short run, when the flexibility of labor
and  capital  is  restricted,  market  protection  may  actually
benefit farmers. If, however, in the long run such structural
rigidities can be abolished as a consequence of institutional
change, a more liberal trade regime would also be positive
for the domestic farm  sector.  In  any  case,  neither  of  the
discussed policies, except improvement of the trade infra-
structure for exports (e.g. railway transport and port capac-
ity),  was  suitable  to  stabilize  the  domestic  grain  market
which suffered from the exceptional increase of domestic
output  between  1999  and  2002.  Given  the  current  input-
output structure in Russia’s agricultural sector, supporting
domestic livestock production by increasing trade protec-
tion would not result in any significant increase of cereal
consumption in this sector and therefore would not be a real
relief for cereal producers. Again only long run investments
into  the  domestic  livestock  sector  and  investments  into
trade infrastructure could significantly alter this.
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Die  langwieriger  als  ursprünglich  erwartet  verlaufenden
Transformationsprozesse  in  Mittel-  und  Osteuropa  haben
verdeutlicht,  wie  wichtig  es  ist,  unsere  Kenntnisse  über
Ursachen  und  Verlauf  des  Wandels  von  Institutionen  zu
vertiefen.  Hierzu  trägt  Antonia  Lütteken  mit  ihrer  Arbeit
bei,  in  der  sie  den  institutionellen  Wandel  im  Bereich
Landwirtschaft und Umwelt am Beispiel Polens untersucht.
Insbesondere analysiert sie vor dem theoretischen Hinter-
grund institutionenökonomischer Ansätze und mit Hilfe des
akteurzentrierten Institutionalismus, wie sich die polnische
Agrarumweltpolitik  seit  Transformationsbeginn  vor  dem
Hintergrund des angestrebten EU-Beitritts und der interna-
tionalen  Diskussionen  über  Nachhaltigkeit  entwickelt  hat
und  ob  sie  sich  als  eigenständiges  Politikfeld  etablieren
konnte.
Die Ergebnisse ihrer im Wesentlichen 1998 durchgeführten
Expertenbefragung bestätigen  ihre  erste  Hypothese,  „dass
die Änderung der äußeren Institutionen durch die Annähe-
rung Polens an die Europäische Union maßgeblichen Ein-
fluss auf die Einbeziehung der Umweltaspekte in die Ges-
taltung  der  Agrarpolitik  hat“  (S.  103).  Nachhaltigkeits-
überlegungen spielen dagegen kaum eine Rolle. Des weite-
ren kommt die Autorin zu dem Ergebnis, dass zwar eine
Schnittmenge zwischen Umwelt- und Agrarpolitik existiert,
aber Schwierigkeiten  bestehen,  „diese  Schnittmenge  auch
institutionell zu festigen und als eigenständiges Handlungs-
feld zu etablieren“ (S. 256).
Die  Arbeit  ist  stringent  aufgebaut.  Im  zweiten  Kapitel
(39 S.)  diskutiert  die  Verfasserin  Umweltprobleme  und
Umweltpolitik  in  Zentralverwaltungswirtschaften  und  mit
der Transformation einhergehende umweltrelevante Verän-
derungen. Sie zeigt auf, dass bei Staatseigentum und Zen-
tralplanung theoretisch zwar die Möglichkeit zur Internali-
sierung  externer  Effekte  gegeben  ist,  in  der  Praxis  aber
nicht realisiert wurde. Als Folge ergaben sich hochgradige,
insbesondere  industriell  verursachte  Umweltbelastungen.
Gleichzeitig verblieben aus unterschiedlichen Gründen aber
auch im Vergleich zu Westeuropa viele Räume in einem
relativ  naturbelassenen  Zustand.  Die  Transformationspro-
zesse gingen nach Lütteken mit folgenden umweltrelevan-
ten Veränderungen einher: Einem verbesserten Zugang zu
Informationen  über  Umweltbelastungen  und  mehr  Mög-
lichkeiten der Partizipation in einer demokratischen Zivil-
gesellschaft,  verringerten  Präferenzen  für  Umweltgüter
aufgrund  des  anfangs  drastischen  Einkommensrückgangs,
der Einführung von Knappheitspreisen (für private Güter)
und  Aufhebung  von  Subventionen,  einer  Neuordnung
von Verfügungsrechten und einer größeren internationalen
Unterstützung im Bereich des Umweltschutzes sowie nicht
zuletzt die Vorbereitung auf den EU-Beitritt.
Während sich Kapitel 2 allgemein auf Mittel- und Osteuro-
pa  bezieht  und  eine  Fülle  für  das  Verständnis  der  Aus-
gangssituation  zu  Beginn  der  Transformation  wichtiger
Informationen liefert, widmet sich die Autorin in Kapitel 3
(56 S.) dann den Verhältnissen in Polen im Bereich Land-
wirtschaft und Umwelt. Sie zeigt unter anderem, dass trotz
des  drastischen  Rückgangs  des  Intensitätsniveaus  zu
Beginn  der  Transformation  („spontane  Extensivierung“)
auch in Polen landwirtschaftlich bedingte Umweltprobleme
existieren und damit (agar)umweltpolitischer Handlungsbe-
darf  besteht.  Die  Beschreibung  der  Transformation  des
Agrarsektors  liefert  für  das  Verständnis  der  Entwicklung
der Agrarumweltpolitik wichtige Fakten, allerdings bezie-
hen  sich  diese  häufig  auf  die  Mitte  der  90er  Jahre.  Die